AbstractÐThe time-triggered message-triggered object (TMO) scheme was formulated a few years ago as a major extension of the conventional object structuring schemes with the idealistic goal of facilitating general-form design and timeliness-guaranteed design of complex real-time application systems. Recently, as a new scheme for realizing TMO-structured distributed and parallel computer systems capable of both hardware and software fault tolerance, we have formulated and demonstrated the primary-shadow TMO replication (PSTR) scheme. An important new extension of the PSTR scheme discussed in this paper is an integration of the PSTR scheme and a network surveillance (NS) scheme. This extension results in a significant improvement in the fault coverage and recovery time bound achieved. The NS scheme adopted is a recently developed scheme effective in a wide range of point-to-point networks and it is called the supervisor-based NS (SNS) scheme. The integration of the PSTR scheme and the SNS scheme is called the PSTR/SNS scheme. The recovery time bound of the PSTR/SNS scheme is analyzed on the basis of an implementation model that can be easily adapted to various commercial operating system kernels.
INTRODUCTION
O PERATIONS of emerging large-scale information systems are entirely or partially of the distributed real-time (RT) data object manipulation type. RT data are the data that are useful for relatively short periods for the given users, although the length of the useful period may differ for different users. Some RT data are kept in memory-resident RT databases, while other RT data are kept in disk-resident RT databases [17] . Another kind of data are stored in archival databases which provide information services with no guaranteed tight response time bounds.
Computer-based systems in safety-critical applications must meet high standards of reliability, maintainability, and expandability [2] , [16] . Output actions taken by these systems should often meet hard deadlines for certain output actions. The failure to meet the deadlines could have disastrous consequences. This dictates that the runtime behavior of the computer systems must be highly predictable. It also means that the interruption in the application system services due to component failures must be strictly limited. Therefore, only rigorously established RT fault tolerance technologies should be used in constructing such systems. Moreover, such systems should be structured in a modular and systematic manner in order to make their maintenance and expansion to be manageable [4] , [6] , [13] , [14] , [16] .
A few years ago, we established the time-triggered message-triggered object (TMO) structuring scheme [7] , [10] , a syntactically minor but semantically powerful extension of conventional object structuring schemes, with the idealistic goal of facilitating general-form design and timeliness-guaranteed design of complex RT application systems. Subsequently, a scheme for realizing TMOstructured distributed and parallel computer systems capable of both hardware and software fault tolerance was developed. It is called the primary-shadow TMO replication (PSTR) scheme and facilitates structuring systems as networks of both nonredundant TMOs and active TMO replicas [9] . It is a result of incorporating the basic underlying principle of the well-established DRB/PSP technique [6] , called the primary-shadow active replication principle, into the TMO structuring scheme. The potential of the PSTR scheme has been demonstrated through incorporation of the scheme into realistic hard-RT application system prototypes.
Among the most important extensions that have not been developed fully are the integrations of the PSTR scheme and network surveillance (NS) schemes. NS schemes facilitate the fast learning by each interested fault-free node in the system of the faults or repair completion events occurring in other parts of the system and also facilitate fast reconfiguration [6] . We recently developed a semicentralized RT NS scheme effective in a wide range of point-to-point networks and it is called the supervisor-based network surveillance (SNS) scheme [11] .
In this paper, we present an integration of the PSTR scheme with the SNS scheme, called the PSTR/SNS scheme. This scheme is a significant improvement over the previous versions of the PSTR scheme in terms of the fault coverage and recovery time bound achieved in the systems based on point-to-point networks. Moreover, this scheme is one of the few software approaches for time-bounded tolerance of both hardware and software faults that can be used for point-to-point network architectures. We also present a concrete modular implementation model of the PSTR/SNS scheme. As a validation experiment, the execution support for the scheme was incorporated into a prototype implementation of the DREAM kernel which is a model of a timeliness-guaranteed operating system kernel developed at the University of California, Irvine [8] , [9] . This implementation, minus a few low-level device-dependent modules, can be viewed as a detailed implementation model that can be easily adapted to various commercial operating system kernels.
We also analyze the performance of the PSTR/SNS scheme based on the presented implementation model for various cases of faults to obtain some tight recovery time bounds. In safety-critical RT distributed computing applications, the recovery time bound is a measure of critical importance, but yet such analyses have scarcely been done until a few years ago. The paper starts in Section 2 with a brief review of the essence of the TMO scheme and the basic design and operating principles of the PSTR scheme. Section 3 presents a system architecture model based on the point-to-point network and also the fault source model, along with the assumed failure frequency bounds. The SNS scheme developed earlier is reviewed in Section 4. Thus, Sections 2 and 4 give an overview of the basic component techniques and were included in order to make this paper self-contained to some extent. Section 5 then presents the basic principles and a modular implementation model of the PSTR/SNS scheme. A recovery time bound analysis of the PSTR/SNS scheme is given in Section 6 and the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 THE ESSENCE OF THE TMO STRUCTURING SCHEME AND THE PSTR SCHEME
The TMO Structuring Scheme
The concrete syntactic structure and the associated precise execution semantics of the TMO, formerly called the RTO.k object, was developed in early 90s [7] , [10] . The basic structure of a TMO is depicted in Fig. 1 . It is an extension of the conventional basic object model(s) and most important extensions can be summarized as follows:
1. Distributed computing object: TMO is a distributed computing object and, thus, TMO's distributed over multiple nodes may interact via remote method calls.
To maximize the concurrency in execution of client methods in one node and server methods in the same node or different nodes, client methods are allowed to make nonblocking types of service requests to server methods. 2. A time-window is imposed for each output action and completion of a method of a TMO. The above two features are not so unique to TMO [1] , [5] but the following features are.
3. Time-triggered (TT-) methods, also called the spontaneous methods (SpMs), and clearly separated from the conventional service methods (SvMs) triggered by messages from clients: SpM executions are triggered as the RT clock reaches some values specified at design time. Actions to be taken at real times which can be determined at the design time can appear only in SpMs. Actions of the type ªat constant-clock-value do Sº or the type ªsleep-until constant-clock-valueº can appear only in SpMs. Therefore, SpMs represent an absolute time domain, whereas SvMs represent a relative time domain. Triggering times for SpMs must be fully specified as constants during the design time. Those real-time constants appear in the first clause of an SpM specification called the autonomous activation condition (AAC) section. An example of an AAC is ªfor t = from 10am to 10:50am every 30min start-during (t, t+5min) finish-by t+10minº
which has the same effect as {ªstart-during (10am, 10:05am) finish-by 10:10am,º ªstart-during (10:30am, 10:35am) finish-by 10:40amº}.
A provision is also made for making the AAC section of an SpM contain only candidate triggering times, not actual triggering times, so that a subset of the candidate triggering times indicated in the AAC section may be dynamically chosen for actual triggering. Such a dynamic selection occurs when an SvM (or another SpM) within the same TMO requests future executions of a specific SpM. 4. Basic concurrency constraint (BCC): In order to significantly reduce the designer's efforts in guaranteeing timely service capabilities of TMOs, activation of an SvM triggered by a message from an external client is allowed only when potentially conflicting SpM executions are not in place. To be exact, when a message-triggered SvM is not free of conflict with an SpM in accessing the same portion (i.e., data members) of the object data store (ODS), execution of the former method (SvM) must not be allowed in a time zone earmarked for a TT-execution of the latter method (SpM). This restriction is called the basic concurrency constraint (BCC). Therefore, executions of SpMs are not disturbed by SvM executions and triggering times of SpMs are fixed at the design time. If a statement of the type ªat 10am do Sº appears in an SpM, its timely execution can be easily assured. However, this BCC imposes no restrictions on the following two new types of possible concurrent executions of object methods or on concurrent executions of SvM's that are also possible in conventional objects: (Type I) Concurrency among SpM executions: This concurrency is specified in an implicit, but natural, manner, e.g., two SpMs designed to be triggered at 10 am.
(Type II) Concurrency between SpM executions and SvM executions.
Explicit connections to the network environment:
The environment access capability IEAC) section of the ODS may include:
a. TMO access capabilities, i.e., unique IDs of the services available from other possibly remote TMO's, and b. connections to programmable logical multicast channels, called programmable data-field channels (DFCs), which are associated with both message queues and distributed replicated variables.
(option)
Ordered isolation (OI) rule: We recently incorporated the following rule that also helps in easing the design-time guaranteeing of timely services. This rule, called the ordered isolation rule, is an optional feature of the TMO structuring scheme. The term initiation timestamp or I-timestamp is used with the following meaning. In the case of an SvM execution, the I-timestamp is defined as the record of the time instant at which the execution engine initiated the SvM execution after receiving the client request for the SvM execution and ensuring that the SvM execution can be initiated without violating the BCC and other execution rules.
In the case of an SpM execution, the I-timestamp is defined as the record of the time instant at which the SpM execution was initiated according to the AAC specification of the SpM. Also, a segment of the object data store (ODS), called an ODS segment (ODSS), is a basic unit of data storage which can be reserved for exclusive access by a method of a TMO. The OI rule has two parts: (OI-1) A method execution with an older I-timestamp must not be waiting for the release of an ODSS held by a method execution with a younger I-timestamp.
(OI-2) A method execution may never be rolled back due to an ODSS conflict.
An underlying design philosophy of the TMO scheme is that an RT computing system will always take the form of a network of TMOs. The designer of each TMO provides a guarantee of timely service capabilities of the object by indicating the time-window for every output produced by each SvM (and each SpM which may be executed on requests from SvMs) in the specification of the SvM (and some relevant SpMs) advertised to the designers of potential client objects. Before determining the time-window specification, the server object designer must convince himself/ herself that, with the object execution engine (hardware plus operating system) available, the server object can be implemented to always execute the SvM such that the output action is performed within the specified timewindow. Again, the BCC contributes to major reduction of these burdens imposed on the designer.
The TMO model is effective not only in the multiple-level abstraction of RT (computer) control systems under design, but also in the accurate representation and simulation of the application environments. In fact, it enables uniform structuring of control computer systems and application environment simulators [7] , [10] and this presents considerable potential benefits to the system engineers.
Also, as discussed in [11] , the TMO scheme can be used for structuring and implementing various types of RT data server objects. A TMO can not only be used as a memoryresident RT data server object, but also encapsulate data in an attached disk and serve as an interface to the users, using its ODS (in memory) effectively as a conduit. Various types of replicas of TMOs can be employed to enhance the reliability and response of the service systems. 
The PSTR Scheme
As mentioned in Section 1, the PSTR scheme is a result of incorporating the basic underlying principle of the DRB/PSP scheme [6] , called the primary-shadow active replication principle, into the TMO structuring scheme [9] . Fig. 2 shows the basic operational rules of the PSTR scheme. The figure shows a fault-free execution cycle of an SvM in a primary TMO and the corresponding execution in the shadow partner TMO where the two partner TMOs are hosted on two different nodes connected to a local area network (LAN). Both the execution of the SvM in the primary TMO, for short, the primary SvM execution, and the shadow SvM execution use the same version P of the computational procedure. The two nodes are said to form a PSTR station.
Node A hosts the initial primary TMO and node B hosts the initial shadow TMO. Both nodes receive the same client request from the network in their appropriate service request queues (SRQs). After the client request arrives, the initiation condition check (ICC) mechanism of the execution engine in the primary node periodically checks whether the required primary SvM execution can be initiated without violating either the BCC or the ordered isolation rule. Upon finding such an appropriate time, the ICC initiates the primary SvM execution. As soon as the primary SvM execution is initiated, it involves saving the client request message into some log cache, the storage which can survive at least as long as the node hosting the TMO does. The reason for saving this message will be evident later in this section. The next step in the primary SvM execution is to inform the shadow TMO of the ID of the client request that the former is going to process. When the ICC in the shadow node receives the client request ID from the primary SvM execution, it starts periodically checking whether the shadow SvM execution can be initiated without violating either the BCC or the ordered isolation rule. Upon finding such an appropriate time, the shadow SvM is initiated by the ICC to process the client request corresponding to the received ID. The shadow SvM execution then starts with saving the client request message into its log cache.
The primary and shadow SvM executions process the client request and invoke their self-checking independently and concurrently by using the same acceptance test (AT) routine [15] , [16] . This routine can be implemented entirely in software. Some errors may be detected by the mechanisms in the execution engine before execution of the AT, but such error detection can be treated in the same manner as the failure in the AT is. Since the primary and the shadow SvM executions both pass the test in Fig. 2 , they independently save all the method execution results into their log cache. Upon saving the results, the primary SvM execution informs the shadow SvM execution of the success of the AT. The former then proceeds to perform all of its output actions (which may include external output actions involving output to entities external to the host TMO as well as internal output actions such as the release of ODSS locks after updates). The primary SvM execution may seek the help of a network surveillance (NS) manager to confirm the successful execution of its external output actions. Once the primary SvM execution confirms the successful delivery of its output, it sends an output success notice to the shadow SvM execution. (If the LAN supports broadcast, it is not necessary for the primary SvM execution to send a separate output success notice to the shadow SvM execution. Instead, the shadow SvM execution can directly receive the primary's output from the broadcast network and thus learn that the primary has successfully sent out its results.)
On the side of the shadow SvM execution, after saving all of its computational results into the log cache, it proceeds to perform its internal output step. That is, it updates the variables of any pertinent ODSSs and releases the locks on the ODSSs. Then, upon receiving the AT success notice, it skips the external output step and waits for the output success notice from the primary partner.
The shadow TMO or SvM execution may learn about the failure of the primary SvM execution in one of the following ways:
1. absence of a client request ID from the primary within a specific deadline which results in the ICC in the shadow node triggering the initiation of the local SvM as the primary SvM execution, 2. absence of an AT result notice from the primary within a specific deadline, 3. an explicit AT failure notice from the primary, or 4. absence of an output success notice from the primary within a specific deadline. Let us now consider a scenario of Case 3. In this scenario, the primary and shadow SvM executions process the client request and perform their self-checking concurrently, but this time the primary SvM execution fails in the AT, whereas the shadow SvM execution passes. As soon as the primary SvM execution fails its AT, it should inform its shadow partner of the failure and change its role to that of the shadow. As a new shadow in the recovery mode, it should then make a retry of the processing of the client request by rolling back to the beginning and retrieving the saved client request message from the log cache. This is why the step of saving the client request message at the beginning is necessary in both the primary and shadow SvM executions. In response to the primary's AT failure notice, the shadow SvM execution will change its role to that of the primary and perform the appropriate external output actions, which can be viewed as a forward recovery action for the primary-shadow TMO object pair.
In Fig. 2 , both the primary and shadow SvM executions use the same computational procedure P . This makes them vulnerable to faults in the computational procedure design since, in such a case, the same design faults will be present in both the primary and shadow SvMs. To ameliorate this problem, we may construct each SvM using the recovery block language construct [15] , [16] , [9] . A recovery block may contain multiple versions of a method procedure, called try blocks, in addition to an AT used to judge the reasonableness of the results produced by each version. Besides the operational rules, basic rules for structuring the primary and shadow TMO methods have been formalized [9] .
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE MODEL, FAULT TYPES, AND FAULT FREQUENCY BOUNDS
As a system architecture model that can represent a variety of point-to-point network architectures, the model depicted in Fig. 3 was chosen. The system consists of m different local area networks (LANs), each LAN consisting of a maximum of n different local nodes and, typically, multiple gateway nodes. Within a LAN, the local nodes may be connected with one another either via a broadcast bus or via a point-to-point network. Two nodes in different LANs communicate with each other through the gateways attached to each LAN. Fig. 3 also shows a region bounded by dotted lines. The nodes within communicate with each other via one or more point-to-point links. These nodes execute the SNS scheme mentioned in Section 1 [10] .
Only a subset of them may be involved in executing a RT application structured by using the PSTR/SNS scheme. For the nodes in each LAN with efficient broadcast facilities, which are outside , some alternate NS scheme such as the periodic reception history broadcast (PRHB) [12] , [6] or the time-triggered protocol (TTP) [12] , which takes advantage of the cheap broadcast facility, may be chosen. Actually, the SNS scheme can be applied to the nodes connected via a broadcast bus in each LAN by assuming that the bus wire is never broken (which is a realistic assumption) and treating each message path between a pair of nodes as a path of two links, one attached to the sender and the other attached to the receiver. For the sake of simplicity in explanation, we concentrate in this paper on the nodes in for application of the PSTR/SNS scheme. Every message sent from a source node to a nonneighbor destination node within is stored for a while in each intermediate node while the node makes a routing decision. Such a routing scheme is called a store-and-forward routing scheme. For example, node in Fig. 3 communicates with Pc through two gateway nodes, say q PI and q QI . The communication from to q PI and then to q QI is over the point-to-point links, whereas the communication from q QI to is over the broadcast bus. This type of system architecture or its minor variations can be found in applications such as defense command-control systems, factory automation systems, etc. As shown in Fig. 3 , each LAN typically has two or more gateways which function in a redundant fashion. Thus, even if one of the gateways becomes faulty, each node in a LAN can still communicate with a node in a different LAN through another gateway.
In typical RT fault-tolerant computer systems using the PSTR scheme, there will be several PSTR stations among which RT data flow. These stations are called here worker PSTR stations. In addition, we may also incorporate a supervisor station in order to make the system highly robust and extend the lifetime of the system [4] , [6] , as shown in Fig. 3 . Actually, the SNS scheme already incorporates a supervisor node that monitors the health status of all the worker nodes, as well as the internode communication links in the system, and, in case of a fault observation, informs all the healthy nodes in the system of the observed fault. In the PSTR/SNS scheme, the supervisor station not only performs all these functions, but also is responsible for detection of the misjudgments made by the nodes in PSTR stations about the status of their partner nodes. It handles reconfiguration of the network including task redistribution, too.
In this section, we first consider various possible sources of faults in the system. Then, we discuss the types and the frequency of fault occurrences that can be tolerated by the PSTR/SNS scheme.
Fault Sources
Since the number of components in a typical point-to-point network architecture is large, a clear and yet accurate representation of all possible fault sources is a challenging issue. The most practical approach here is to group various potential fault sources into a manageable set of categories.
In the model depicted in Fig. 3 , possible sources of faults in a node are represented by a processor, an incoming communication handling unit (I-unit), and an outgoing communication handling unit (O-unit). Faults in the processor represent faults in the executing software that could cause the node to crash, faults in the processor hardware, faults in memory modules, etc. Faults in the I-unit represent faults in various components of a node (both hardware and software) that are involved in receiving a message from the network. Faults in the O-unit represent faults in various components of a node (both hardware and software) that are involved in sending a message to the network. Any observed fault of a node could be an instance of a combination of faults in the fault sources mentioned above. The remaining fault source is the point-to-point interconnection network. Faults here represent various faults occurring in one or more links of the network.
In the remaining discussion, we call each of the four fault sources described in the fault source model above a fault source component. This model is more precise than that frequently appearing in the literature, i.e., the model in which monolithic processing nodes (rather than the three types of smaller fault source components, processor, I-unit, and O-unit) and node-to-node links are the only diagnosable fault source components. It is yet amenable to thorough and efficient behavior analyses. We assume that, since the routing scheme is of the store-and-forward type, a permanent fault of any one of the fault source components in a node disables not only the node's processing capabilities but also the node's routing capabilities.
Fault Types Covered and Fault Frequencies Assumed
The PSTR/SNS scheme has been designed to tolerate various types of faults that occur in various fault sources mentioned in the preceding section subject to the fault frequency assumptions stated below. Of the assumptions, A1-A4 have been made for the SNS scheme [11] .
A1. The processors in the system are of the fail-silent type and the task processes do not export erroneous messages. A2. The clocks in the nodes are kept synchronized sufficiently closely for practical purposes, i.e., for the given applications. 
A3
. Each of the nodes performing store-and-forward functions (as well as the source node) transmits each stored message twice continuously. It is assumed that this makes the probability of transient fault occurrences in the components of the two neighbor nodes and those in the link between the two neighbor nodes causing message losses to be negligible. This dual redundant transmission approach was also exploited in [12] . A4. Let x be the set of fault source components belonging to a node x and vv Y be {link connecting two neighbor nodes and }. The time interval from the time of the occurrence of a permanent hardware fault F in x or in vv Y to the time every healthy node in the system learns of the fault occurrence under the SNS scheme is the detection period of the SNS scheme for the fault F. The SNS scheme assumes that during that detection period, no other hardware fault occurs in node w, where w T x, or in vvsY t, where sY t T Y .
The worst-case detection latency of the SNS scheme for a possible hardware fault in the system is denoted by hv x . Therefore, it is assumed that no second permanent hardware fault occurs in the system within hv x time units after the occurrence of the first permanent hardware fault F. Let be the set of the models of the nodes in a PSTR station: fx pri Y x sh g, where x pri represents the set of three fault source components (processor, I-unit, O-unit) in the primary node and x sh represents the set of three fault source components in the shadow node. Let denote the set of all models of the nodes in the application system, i.e., the models of the nodes in all PSTR stations that execute the fault-tolerant application. Obviously, ' . Let denote the maximum interval of time between the occurrence of a permanent fault in a PSTR station and the completion of the repairing of the faulty situation, which may involve relocating a member node of the station, as will be discussed in Section 4. It is safe to say that is much larger than hv x . A5. In a time interval of , the permanent faults of two or more nodes in , at least one of which is the primary node of a PSTR station and another of which is the shadow node of the same PSTR station, are assumed to have a negligible probability of occurrence.
On one hand, this can be viewed as a more stringent assumption than A4 since ) hv x . On the other hand, this assumption is restricted to the cases where the second fault is related to the same PSTR station, whereas A4 is not restricted to such cases. However, the permanent faults of multiple nodes which involve no more than one node in any PSTR station in a time interval longer than hv x are considered. This is because such faults have a relatively higher probability of occurrence than the faults of multiple nodes involving both nodes of a PSTR station do. Such faults may be nonnegligible in large-scale networks. Therefore, the PSTR scheme is designed to have the following capabilities:
1. It is designed to handle 100 percent of the cases of multiple permanent faults that occur within a time interval of RT in such a spread form that no more than one node in any PSTR station is faulty; 2. It can handle some, but not all, cases of multiple permanent faults that occur in the same PSTR station within a time interval of .
A6. In a time interval of , the transient faults of both partner nodes in a PSTR station are assumed to have a negligible probability of occurrence. However, the transient faults of multiple nodes in the system which involve no more than one node in any PSTR station in a time interval of are considered, again because such faults have a relatively higher probability of occurrence than the transient faults of multiple nodes involving both nodes of a PSTR station do. A7. The topology of the point-to-point network used, the nature of the application, and the task relocation arrangement are such that the node and link failures occurring within the bounds of A4, A5, and A6 cannot lead to permanent partitioning of the application system into inoperable disconnected subsystems during the lifetime of the application mission.
4 OVERVIEW OF THE SNS SCHEME Fig. 4 shows the basic operation of the SNS scheme. As shown in the figure, there are two types of nodes that execute the SNS scheme, the worker nodes and a supervisor node. The worker nodes are mainly responsible for judging their own health status, the health status of their neighbor nodes, and the health status of the links attached to themselves. The supervisor node performs all the duties that a worker normally does. In addition, it is responsible for collecting fault suspicion reports from worker nodes, using the collected information to judge which node or link may be faulty, and then sending the fault occurrence notice to all the healthy worker nodes in the system. The SNS scheme is executed by a set of nodes x that consists of n worker nodes and a supervisor node. Under the normal mode of operation, each node in x will have at least two healthy neighboring nodes. If the number of neighbors of a node x in x drops down to one, then we treat x as a component of its neighbor node . Thereafter, and its neighbors are responsible for detecting the faults in x. A subset of x is involved in actively executing some distributed RT application tasks. In Fig. 3, x would be all the nodes within the region or a subset of them.
Under the SNS scheme, two copies of every message are sent from a source node to a destination node, the first copy along one path I and the second copy along an disjoint alternate path P . Under assumptions A3, A4, and A7, it is always possible for the source node to find I and P such that at least one copy of the message sent will definitely reach the destination node as long as the source node and the destination node are healthy during the period of the message transmission.
1. Basic duties of worker nodes: All the healthy worker nodes in the system perform the following basic duties:
a. Every healthy worker node in the system periodically exchanges heartbeat signal messages with each of its healthy neighbors at the interval of %. b. Absence of a heartbeat signal from a neighbor node within a specific deadline will raise the suspicion of the worker node. The suspecting node then proceeds to find out the location of the fault at the level of the fault source components modeled in Section 3. Here, a healthy node cannot distinguish between a permanent fault in the O-unit in its neighbor node from a permanent crash of the processor in the latter node. c. Once the worker node locates the fault source component to the extent it can, it sends a fault suspicion report to the supervisor. 2. Duties of the supervisor: The supervisor node performs the following additional duties:
a. Once the supervisor receives a fault suspicion report from a worker node, it judges which node or link may be faulty. For this, the supervisor may use the fact that it has received a certain type of fault suspicion reports from k b I worker nodes. b. After judging the source and extent of the fault, the supervisor proceeds to inform the relevant nodes of the detected fault.
Special duties of the supervisor's neighbor nodes:
The supervisor's neighbor nodes also perform the following additional duties:
a. Make a group decision about the health of the supervisor, b. In case the current supervisor is judged to be faulty, participate in a new supervisor election in which each of the current supervisor's healthy neighbors takes part, and c. Once one among the old supervisor's neighbors is elected as a new supervisor, the newly elected supervisor informs all the healthy worker nodes about the fault in the old supervisor as well as the assumption of its new supervisor role.
THE PSTR/SNS SCHEME
One of the most important extensions of the PSTR scheme is the integration of the PSTR scheme and a network surveillance (NS) scheme. Integration of the PSTR scheme with NS schemes tend to significantly improve the fault coverage and recovery time bounds over other versions of the scheme in which no NS scheme is incorporated. The SNS scheme is a good candidate for integration with the PSTR scheme to achieve fault tolerance with minimal bounded delay in point-to-point networks owing to its ability to detect a wide variety of faults within a bounded and small delay. This new integrated scheme, called the PSTR/SNS scheme, is one of the few effective software approaches for time-bounded tolerance of both hardware and software faults that can be used for TMO-structured systems based on point-to-point network architectures. It is effective in general-topology point-to-point networks.
Rules of the PSTR/SNS Scheme
The operating rules of the PSTR/SNS scheme are a superset of those of PSTR discussed in Section 2 and so, here, we will only discuss the additional rules introduced in the PSTR/ SNS scheme.
Both the primary and the shadow PSTR nodes
execute the SNS scheme. 2. In the case in which a shadow method execution detects the absence of a data ID from the primary method within a certain deadline, it will change its role to that of the primary, pick up a new input data item to process, and execute its try block and acceptance test (AT). After passing the AT and before updating its object data store segment (ODSS) and sending the output message out, the new primary method execution will seek the help of the SNS subsystem executing in the host node to find out if it has misjudged the status of its partner method execution. That is, it tries to find out if any permanent I-unit fault has occurred in the host node and caused it to miss the data ID message from the partner method execution and switch its role to change from that of the shadow to that of the primary. For this, the new primary checks whether x time units have gone past since the time at which the data ID message would have arrived at the host node under normal fault-free circumstances. As mentioned in Section 3, x is the worst-case fault detection latency of the SNS scheme. This step is necessary to prevent the two partner nodes from entering dangerous inconsistent states. Only after the new primary method execution confirms that the host node has been fault-free, will it produce the output. Otherwise, it will initiate a spontaneous shutdown of the node. Thus, a faulty node does not produce any external outputs.
The steps taken by the supervisor node are as follows:
1. The steps for executing the SNS scheme: The supervisor performs all the requisite actions for the SNS scheme outlined in Section 4. 2. The step for checking and acting on anomalies detected in worker PSTR stations: The supervisor node checks whether any anomalous conditions have occurred in worker PSTR stations. Such conditions include the playing of the primary role by both partner nodes in a worker PSTR station, the lack of response from a primary partner to the shadow partner's request for a specific input data item, etc. In such cases, the supervisor will take an action to rectify the anomaly. 3. The step for notifying database updates to each of the healthy neighbors: Whenever the supervisor node updates its database on the supervisory information, e.g., distribution of TMOs, primaryshadow partnership among the nodes, etc., it sends an update notice to its neighbors so that the neighbors may keep their own copies of the supervisor's database up-to-date. These actions are necessary in order that a newly elected supervisor (which will be one among the current supervisor's neighbors) can take over the supervisory functions in case the current supervisor node fails.
The steps taken by a healthy neighbor node of the supervisor can be formally described as follows:
1. The steps for executing the SNS scheme: The neighbor node performs all the requisite actions for the SNS scheme outlined in Section 4. 2. The step for saving a copy of any message bound for the supervisor node: Whenever node forwards a message bound for the supervisor node, it keeps a copy until it receives a new database update notice from the supervisor node. 3. The step for updating a copy of the supervisory database: Upon receiving a database update notice from the supervisor node, node updates its copy of the supervisory database.
Attractive Features of the PSTR/SNS Scheme
The PSTR/SNS scheme is an attractive choice for timebounded fault tolerance in point-to-point networks due to the following:
1. The scheme is capable of tolerating a wide variety of faults and offers tight recovery time bounds. The overhead incurred due to the scheme during normal fault-free operations is also small. 2. The scheme can be implemented entirely in software without any special-purpose hardware support. 3. The scheme can be used for fault-tolerant execution of TMOs in a large class of point-to-point networks with different interconnection network topologies. 4. The scheme has a modular and scalable structure. It can be applied to all TMOs in an application or critical TMOs only. Also, it offers high cost-effectiveness and flexibility, especially in comparison to schemes such as the N-version programming scheme [3] .
A Modular Implementation
Model of the PSTR/ SNS Scheme and a Prototype Implementation in the DREAM Kernel The implementation model for the primary SvM execution support is similar and will not be discussed.
All four kernel-threads are structured as time-triggered (TT-) threads. They are periodically acting threads whose execution is driven by the real-time clock. This structuring eases the determination of the worst-case service times of these threads and, hence, eases the analysis of the recovery time bound of the PSTR/SNS scheme. The functions of the primary SpM process and the four kernel-threads are as follows:
1. Primary SpM Process: This is the combination of the primary logic of the SpM and additional features to support the PSTR/SNS scheme. 2. WTMT: This thread is mainly responsible for supporting the execution of the TMO methods. Specifically, this thread triggers the execution of SpMs at instants of real-time determined at the design time and also triggers the execution of SvMs upon the arrival of each client request message. Before triggering the execution of SvMs, this thread checks whether both the BCC and ordered isolation rules are satisfied. In addition, this kernel-thread checks whether the method execution violates the try block execution deadlines and, in case a deadline violation is detected, it orders the primary method to turn to a shadow through a message deposited in timeout . 3. NPT: This is responsible for almost everything in the SNS scheme described in Section 4 except the generation of the heartbeat signals. For example, some or all of the functions, such as periodic analysis of the received heartbeat signals, reporting fault suspicions, election of a supervisor, and supervisory function, are handled by this kernel-thread, depending on the role of the host node (a worker node, supervisor node or a neighbor of the supervisor node). This thread also notifies a TMO method process (i.e., primary SpM process, shadow SvM process, etc.) of any detected faults in the host node (by depositing an order to shut down in order checked by the TMO method process). In addition, this thread honors any requests from the partner or supervisor. 4. ICT: This thread distributes the messages received in i from other nodes to appropriate destination queues. In particular, it periodically forwards the messages that should be processed by NPT into x and the client request messages into checked by an SvM. In addition, it also deposits any external input data items into is checked by a TMO method.
OCT:
This thread sends to the point-to-point network the messages found in y such as output data items that came from the TMO method and the messages related to the SNS scheme deposited into y by the NPT. In addition, this generates and sends heartbeat signals to each of the node's healthy neighbors as a part of the SNS scheme. The modular implementation model for the shadow SpM is similar to that of the primary SpM except for the following differences:
1. Shadow SpM Process: This is the combination of the shadow logic of the SpM and additional features to support the PSTR/SNS scheme. The try block (computation procedure) used in this SpM execution is generally designed such that that its execution time is similar to that of the primary try block. 2. WTMT: This kernel-thread checks whether the TMO method execution violates the try block execution deadlines set in dedline and, in case a deadline violation is detected, it orders, through a message deposited in timeout , the method execution to retry its try block. As for triggering SvM executions, it does so only in two cases, in contrast to its primary counterpart: a) when both the client request message ID from the primary SvM execution and the corresponding request message from the client have arrived or b) when the NPT detects the fault of the primary node and a client request message for the SvM has arrived at the shadow node. 3. NPT: Besides performing the functions such as periodic analysis of the received heartbeat signals, reporting fault suspicions, election of a supervisor, etc. as its primary counterpart does, this thread notifies the method execution of any detected faults in the host node or in the primary node (by depositing an order to shut down or change its role to that of the primary in order checked by the method execution). In addition, this thread honors any requests from the supervisor or the partner. For instance, the supervisor may order the node to shut the latter's operation down. 4. ICT: Besides depositing messages into x , , and is as its primary counterpart does, this thread deposits the client request ID message, the AT result message, and the output success notice (OSN) message received from the primary method execution into e checked by the shadow method execution.
The function of this thread is the same as that of its primary counterpart. If any fault occurs in the primary method execution, the shadow method execution will learn of the fault either by an explicit notice from the primary (as in the case of an AT failure in the primary) or in one of the following four ways:
1. a notice from the WTMT of the shadow node regarding the absence of a client request ID from the primary partner within a specific deadline hv sh , or 2. a notice from the WTMT of the shadow node regarding the absence of an AT result output from the primary partner within a specific deadline hv e , or 3. a notice from the WTMT of the shadow node regarding the absence of an OSN message from the primary partner within a specific deadline hv yx , or 4. a notice from the NPT of the shadow node that the primary node has failed. The modular structuring of the PSTR/SNS scheme allows easy incorporation of complementary mechanisms for NS. For instance, by changing the logic in the NPT alone, one could incorporate another NS scheme such as the periodic reception history broadcast scheme [6] that will provide hardware fault detection information to the PSTRstructured TMO methods.
A prototype implementation of the model discussed above has been implemented as a part of the DREAM (Distributed Real-time Ever Available Microcomputing kernel prototype [8] running on an Ethernet LAN of PC's. Two TMOs of a defense command-control application have been made tolerant to both hardware and software faults using the PSTR/SNS scheme. However, the PSTR/SNS prototype does not utilize any of the broadcast facility available in the Ethernet environment since it has been developed for point-to-point network architectures. The size of the PSTR/SNS implementation came to about 5,000 lines of C++ code. However, the DREAM kernel prototype itself is much larger; about 20,000 lines of C++ code. The size of the two PSTR-structured TMOs of the defense command-control application came to about 3,000 lines of C++ code. The thread-time-slice chosen was 2 msec. The ICT, OCT, and the WTMT were implemented as TT threads running at the frequency of one execution per four threadtime-slices. The heartbeat generation interval was chosen to be 24 msec. The NPT was executed at the frequency of one execution per 12 thread-time-slices. Different types of faults (including permanent I-unit (PI) fault, permanent O-unit (PO) fault, processor crash, link fault, etc.) were injected and it was observed that the TMOs were able to recover from all the faults within the specified deadlines.
This implementation, minus a few low-level devicedependent modules, can be viewed as a detailed implementation model that can be easily adapted to various commercial operating system kernels.
RECOVERY TIME BOUND ANALYSIS OF THE PSTR/SNS SCHEME
The analysis of a tight recovery time bound for any realtime fault tolerance scheme is an important task, but it was a scarce practice until a few years ago. These kinds of analyses provide useful guides to engineers who aspire to produce high-assurance fault-tolerant real-time computer systems. The analysis here is based on the prototype implementation discussed in Section 5.
Notations

N1. Time t:
Time t is defined as the instant at which an event occurs. N2. Time interval dY : Let and denote two types of ordered events that take place in the order Y . Then, dY is defined as the time interval from the start of to the end of . Maximum time interval that elapses from the time a message leaves the y checked by the ICT of a node to the time the message reaches the i of any other node in the system. This time includes the time taken for redundant transmissions of the same message over two different paths as explained in Section 3. 6. Maximum thread turnaround time: Maximum interval of time that elapses from the time an item arrives at any of the input queues of the thread to the time the corresponding output is produced. Maximum ICT turnaround time is denoted as ws and maximum OCT turnaround time is denoted as wy . 7. Worst-case fault detection latency hv x of the SNS scheme: Maximum amount of time between the occurrence of a fault p {node fault, link fault} and the learning of the fault occurrence by all the healthy nodes in the system. 8. Lag limit vqv of the shadow: This is defined as the maximum interval of time a shadow method execution can lag behind the corresponding primary method execution without inducing the risk of missing the deadline for taking the final output action(s). If the shadow method execution exceeds this lag limit, it should enter a node recovery mode and try to catch up with the primary.
Definitions
Recovery Time Bound of the PSTR/SNS Scheme
Fig . 6 shows the timing chart of the primary and shadow SvM executions under fault-free conditions. Various events that occur in the primary and the shadow nodes of a PSTR station under fault-free conditions are shown. The three parameters of interest in Fig. 6 are MIT, MOT, and TRANS. According to the definitions given in Section 6.1, the worstcase time interval between the arrival of a client request message in i of the primary node (event I1 p -a) and the time at which the ICT finishes moving this message to (event I2 p -a) in Fig. 6 is shown as MIT time units. Similarly, the worst-case time interval between the arrival of a message in y (event O1-i) and the time at which the OCT finishes sending this message to the network (event O1-s) is shown as MOT time units. Finally, the worst-case time interval between the event O1-s of the primary node and I2-a of the shadow node is shown as TRANS time units.
For simplicity in the analysis of the recovery time bounds, we assume that the difference between tsI p E and tsI s E is negligible. Note that v ff includes the time period during which the client request message waits in to be picked up by the primary SvM execution, which includes the time period for satisfying the basic concurrency constraint and ordered isolation rules. The bound for this waiting time should also be known at the design time. This timing chart facilitates the calculation of various deadlines used to detect faults. The deadline in the shadow node for the checking of the client request ID from the primary for a particular client request message X is calculated as tsI p E dsI p EY yIEi dyIEiY yIEs dyIEsY sPE dsPEY sPEp vqv tsI s E dsI p EY yIEi wy ex ws vqv hv sh X
I
Here, LGL, the lag limit, is the tolerable delay that can be incurred by the shadow SvM execution in checking the arrival of the client request ID from the primary partner. tsI s E is the time at which X arrived at the shadow node, and dsI p EY yIEi is the sum of the queuing delay of X at the primary node and the time taken by the primary SvM process to execute the step for sending the ID of X to the shadow. The worst-case value for dsI p EY yIEi, WQD (worst-case queuing delay), can be quite accurately estimated by the shadow node by using the time at which the OSN arrived at the shadow node in the immediately preceding cycle, the time at which X arrived at the shadow node, and the subsequent time duration to satisfy the basic concurrency constraint and ordered isolation rules. Note that a copy of X is assumed to have arrived at both the primary and the shadow nodes roughly at the same time. Thus, once a client request message arrives at the shadow node, the shadow SvM execution should check for the arrival of the ID of the client request message from the partner within h wy ex ws vqv time units. This deadline hv sh can also be viewed as wy ex ws vqv time units after the event occurrence O1(i) in the primary node. Suppose this ªintermediateº deadline is violated. The shadow SvM process will change its role to that of the primary, pick up a new client request message, deposit its ID in y , and start the processing of a new request message. After the new primary passes the AT, it first checks whether the time interval of hv x units has gone past since the time at which the client request ID would have arrived at the shadow SvM execution's client request ID queue. Note that the time at which the shadow SvM execution checks this condition will be in the worst case equal to hv sh exe , where exe is the worst-case time for executing the step of picking the new client request message, depositing the client request ID in y , and, finally, executing both the primary try block and the AT after sending the ID (Fig. 6) .
The time at which the client request ID would have arrived at the ID queue will be equal to hv sh À vqv and the shadow SvM execution checks for the presence of the client request ID vqv time units later in the worst case. This means that the shadow SvM execution waits for hv sh À vqv hv x À hv sh exe hv x À vqv exe time units after executing its try block and AT, where x x if x b H and x H if x H.
Also, the worst-case processing time of the SvM in the normal fault-free case is v ff h exe he yw wy Y P where he yw is the time taken to execute the steps of depositing the AT result and the output message in y . The shadow SvM process can learn of the faults occurred in the primary node in four major ways besides relying on a notice from the primary itself. The recovery time bound of the PSTR/SNS scheme can be determined by considering these cases.
Case 1: WTMT in the shadow node detects the absence of a client request ID from the primary by hv sh .
As soon as the shadow SvM execution reads the notice from the WTMT about the absence of the client request ID, it will change its role to that of the primary and send the client request ID out. Note that, in this case, the new primary will execute the step of depositing the ID into y , execute the primary version of the application logic and then the AT, by taking up to exe time units. After passing the AT, the new primary waits (for hv x À vqv À exe time units) for confirmation from the NPT as to the fact that the host node has been fault-free. Once the NPT confirms the fault-free status, the new primary will send out the AT result, the output, and, finally, the OSN.
The time interval between the time of arrival of the input data item and the time of sending the output is thus (using (1), (2) , and the fact that tsI p E tsI s E Case 2: WTMT in the shadow node detects the absence of AT result from the primary by hv e . hv e for the reception of the AT result for a specific client request message can be set in the shadow node as hv sh exe since a primary SvM execution does not wait for any advice from the NPT before sending the AT result under normal circumstances. Only, when a shadow SvM execution changes its role to that of the primary due to the absence of a client request ID from the primary within hv sh , the new primary waits for hv x À vqv À exe time units after passing its try block and AT in order to confirm its fault-free status. Based on an analysis similar to that used in Case 1, it is easy to see that the recovery time is wy ex ws vqv time units.
Case 3: WTMT in the shadow node detects the absence of OSN from the primary within hv yx .
This case is similar to case 2 and the recovery time here is again wy ex ws vqv time units.
Case 4: NPT in the shadow node detects that the primary node has failed.
Even though the NPT may notify the shadow SvM process at any time during the execution, the shadow SvM process will check for such a notice only when it is activated or when it waits for a message from the primary. Therefore, the recovery time cannot be greater than that in the three preceding cases (1, 2, and 3) .
The recovery time bound analysis for an SpM execution is quite similar to the procedure described above and we will not illustrate it here. In the case of an SpM execution, WQD (worst-case queuing delay) is the time interval between the time a data item Y is deposited in an ODSS and the time the SpM reads the data item.
The results of the above analysis can be summarized as follows. Numerical example. In the DREAM kernel prototype, ws wy V mse. Also, in [11] hv x for the DREAM kernel was calculated as 143 msec. If we choose ex IH mse, and vqv I mse, exe PHH mse, then f PU mse.
CONCLUSION
The TMO structuring scheme is one specific approach aimed for facilitating the general-form design style and the design-time guaranteeing of timely service capabilities of objects. The PSTR scheme formulated on the basis of the TMO structuring scheme is an approach for designing realtime fault tolerance capabilities into the TMO-structured application systems. In this paper, we have presented an integration of the PSTR with the SNS scheme which improves the fault coverage and recovery time bounds of the PSTR scheme. An analysis of the recovery time bounds of the PSTR/SNS scheme has also been presented. This analysis was based on a modular implementation model. Efficient integration of the PSTR scheme with other NS schemes is one of many meaningful topics for future research.
